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i. Cases 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 
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Rule 27(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 13 
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Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Section 
_ o _ 
78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code, and the limitations of Section 78-2-3, 
Utah Code. 
Nature of Proceedings 
This is the second appeal of this case. This appeal is 
from the Amended Judgment entered on remand by the Honorable 
Dennis J. Frederick. 
Statement of Issues on Appeal 
I. On remand, did the lower court err in granting 
judgment for the full amount of attorney fees requested by 
Cottonwood, without permitting discovery on the reasonableness 
of those fees? 
II. Did the lower court exceed its instructions on 
remand, when it allowed judgment for attorney fees after the 
leased premises were vacated. 
Determinative Authorities 
Attached hereto as Appendix A, is the controlling case: 
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the prior decision on appeal in this matter. Cottonwood Mall 
Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from the Amended Judgment entered May 
2ndf 1989. A copy of that judgment is attached hereto as 
Appendix B. About half of that amount is for attorney fees. A 
judgment of about $62/000 was also entered against the sureties 
Jerry and Dora Sine at the same time. This appeal is on behalf 
of all judgment defendants. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
i. Initial proceedings. Cottonwood sued Sine for 
unlawful detainer to recover space in the Cottonwood Mall. R. 
2-44. Cottonwood Bowling Lanesf Inc. intervened. R. 133-34. 
Sine and Cottonwood (referred to hereinafter jointly as "Sine" 
for convenience) counterclaimed to enforce an oral agreement. 
R. 53-94; 133-34. The pleadings were amended various times, and 
substantial discovery was conducted. 
After trialf Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a 
Judgment were entered in favor of Cottonwood Mall. R. 
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1085-1100; 1223-24. Sine appealed. R. 1229-30, 1255-56. Jerry 
and Dora Sine filed a Supersedeas Appeal Bond, which was later 
approved. R. 1231-34. Cottonwood Mall cross appealed the trial 
court's failure to award attorney fees. 
ii. Proceedings on appeal. The matter was fully briefed 
and argued, and this Court issued its decision November 17, 
1988. 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988). This Court held: 
a. Cottonwood Mall, a joint venture, could sue in 
its common name without having to name the joint venturers as 
parties plaintiff. 
b. The trial court properly found that the lease 
had terminated by its own terms, and that the alleged oral 
agreement to renew the lease upon reasonable terms was not 
enforceable. 
c. Sine held over after the term of the lease, 
creating a month to month tenancy on the same general terms as 
the original lease. 
d. Sine had a duty to vacate when requested to do 
so on October 23, 1981, and "when [he] failed to do so, the 
provision for the payment of attorney fees became operative.ff 
767 P. 2d at 503. Attorney fees for "actions by the lessor to 
secure possession of the premises" should have been awarded to 
Cottonwood. Id. 
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Sine petitioned for rehearing. The petition was denied 
January 25, 1989. 
iii. Proceedings on remand. Cottonwood proceeded to 
move for an amended judgment against Sine, to include attorney 
fees, and also against the sureties on the supersedeas bond. R. 
1770-1775. Cottonwood requested that the judgment include 
$57,628.57 principal and interest, attorney fees through the 
trial period (including interest) totaling $39,744.62, and 
post-judgment attorney fees (including appeal) of $6,641.58. 
Cottonwood requested compounded interest. 
With the proposed judgment Cottonwood's counsel offered 
as evidence a three page "Affidavit of Attorney's Fees." R. 
1788-90. The affidavit was caste in very broad terms. 
Sine and the sureties objected to the judgment. R. 
1801-05. The parties briefed the issue of what attorney fees 
should be awarded, including whether they should include amounts 
incurred after judgment, the reasonableness of the amount 
claimed and whether discovery should be allowed on the 
reasonableness of the fees and the timeliness of Sine's 
objection. R. 1802-26. 
iv. Disposition at trial. No new trial was held. The 
lower court granted the judgment May 2, 1990, disallowing 
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Cottonwood's attempt to compound the interest/ denying Sine's 
objection to the proposed judgment and for oral argument. R. 
1827/ 1834-35A. The total judgment was $98/706.20/ including 
pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. R. 1835A. Of that 
amount $65/400 is also a judgment against the supersedeas 
sureties. R. 1847. No discovery was permitted as to the 
reasonableness or specific nature of the claimed attorney fees. 
A copy of the judgment is attached as Appendix B. 
v. New appeal* Sine and the sureties appealed from the 
Amended Judgment May 26/ 1990. Cottonwood has proceeded with 
post-judgment remedies. R. 1864-1988. 
The district court misplaced the record/ and an extension 
to file this brief was granted through and including May 9, 
1990. The four volume record was located by the lower court and 
delivered to the undersigned counsel the afternoon of May 8/ 
1990. 
C. Relevant Facts 
The facts are as set forth in the prior appeal/ attached 
as Appendix A. The are also set forth in the immediately 
preceding section titled "Course of Proceedings." This appeal 
is procedural in nature and the above indicated procedural facts 
are relevant. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
aassBssss ' ' "nBSSsssssas 
This Court's remand to award attorney fees did not give 
the trial court carte blanche to enter judgment for all amounts 
requested/ refusing to allow discovery as to the reasonableness 
of the fees. 
The Court remanded the case for a determination only of 
fees to which plaintiff is entitled "under paragraph 33 of the 
written lease". It was error to go beyond the terms of that 
paragraph/ awarding fees for periods after Sine vacated the 
leased premises. 
ARGUMENT 
1. This appeal is simply resolved, mostly by an 
examination of the Court's opinion in the first appeal. A copy 
of that opinion is attached hereto as Appendix "A". The portion 
that applies to this appeal is principally contained in the last 
page of the opinion. Cottonwood Mall Company v. Sine/ 767 P.2d 
499/ 503 (Utah 1988)/ rehearing denied/ Jan. 25f 1989. 
The trial court initially denied Cottonwood Mall any 
attorney fees. On remand the instruction to award them was 
limited by the terms of the Opinion/ however. 767 P.2d at 503. 
The trial court exceeded its bounds in giving Cottonwood Mall 
everything it wanted. 
In addition to looking to the language of the decision of 
this Court, paragraph 33 of the lease must be considered 
controlling. A copy of pages eight and nine of the lease, 
containing that paragraph, is included as Appendix nC". 
The Opinion and paragraph 33 of the lease will be 
discussed further below. 
2. Discovery should have been permitted on the 
reasonableness of attorney fees. This Court instructed the 
lower court to "determine and fix the amount of attorney fees 
and trial and appeal costs to which plaintiff is entitled under 
paragraph 33 of the the written lease." Id. The trial judge 
received no evidence but an affidavit of Cottonwood's counsel to 
"determine" that amount. R. 1788-90; 1834-36. 
All the information on the reasonableness of the fees is 
in the exclusive possession of Cottonwood and its counsel. Yet 
Sine was denied access to any of that information, with the 
exception of the affidavit. 
3. The affidavit was inadequate. The affidavit was 
extraordinarily general and uninformative. It is attached as 
Appendix D, and essentially states: 
a. The lawsuit required substantial legal work. 
b. Counsel had reviewed his billing records, and 
they indicated pre-judgment fees "including office costs passed 
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on the Plaintiff directly (sic)" totaling nearly $40,000 with 
interest. R. 1789, App. D, 1[ 3. 
c. The appeal had allowed Cottonwood attorney fees. 
Id. 11 4. Rehearing was denied. 1[ 5. 
d. Counsel's "review of records as referred to above 
indicates post-judgment attorney fees in the amount of 
$6,641.58." Id. 11 6. 
The affidavit stated that "office ledger records" were 
attached." 11 7. However, only seven mostly unintelligible 
pages were included. Neither the affidavit nor any other 
evidence before the trial court indicated any of the following: 
a. That the fees charged were reasonable. 
b. The breakdown of the fees. 
c. The hourly rate charged for most of the time 
periods involved. 
d. The specific activities performed (with the 
exception of four entries totaling $718.75). R. 1791. 
e. What portion of the fees was incurred before Sine 
vacated the premises. 
f. What portion of the fees was incurred after Sine 
vacated the premises. 
The sworn statement was only that counsel had reviewed 
the records and that they "indicate [d]" the fees claimed. It 
does not even state that the records are accurate. 
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4. Sine and the sureties objected to the proposed 
judgment. They argued as follows (R. 1802-05; 1816-22): 
a. The fees should be limited to amounts incurred in 
obtaining possession of the premises (November 30, 1981). 
b. The interest computation was in error (not an 
issue on appeal). 
c. The fees claimed were unreasonably high (142 
percent of the original amount claimed of $32,700). 
d. Discovery should be allowed on the reasonableness 
of the fees. R. 1805. 
Nevertheless, the trial court essentially accepted the affidavit 
at face value, immune to challenge. 
5. Attorney fees were properly subject to discovery. 
The scope of discovery is broad. See, State ex rel. Road Commfn 
v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914 (1966). Rule 26(b) 
provides: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the pending action, whether it 
relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any 
other party . . . . [so long as it] appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). The scope is surely 
broad enough to encompass revelation of the details underlying 
such a substantial part of Cottonwood's judgment. 
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The trial court may limit the extent and frequency of 
discoveryf but only if the court 
determines that: (i) the discovery sought is 
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is 
obtainable from some other source that is more 
convenience/ less burdensome, or less expensive/ 
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample 
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain 
the information sought; or (iii) the discovery is 
unduly burdensome or expensive. . . • 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). Discovery may even be 
permitted during an appeal. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
27(b). Of course here the matter was on remand/ and no special 
authority was required to allow normal discovery before hastily 
entering judgment. 
Because all information regarding the reasonableness and 
accuracy of the attorney fee claim lies in the exclusive 
possession of Cottonwood and its counsel/ Sine provided an 
affidavit to that effect in compliance with Rule 56(f)/ Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 1821-22. The affidavit explained 
that because of lack of discovery/ Sine and the sureties were 
unable to provide a counter-affidavit opposing the attorney fee 
amounts claimed by Cottonwood. Id. Disregarding this 
affidavit/ the trial court entered judgment without allowing 
discovery. 
6. Trial should have been allowed on the attorney fee 
issue. The amount of fees owed could only be determined by the 
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trial court by evidenciary hearing, since the Rule 56(f) 
affidavit made the fees a factual issue. This should have 
occurred after Sine and the sureties were armed with reasonable 
discovery regarding the attorney fee claim. A mere affidavit 
was not competent evidence under the circumstances. 
7. This Court's limits the attorney fees Cottonwood may 
collect. It is entitled only to those "to which [it] is 
entitled under paragraph 33 of the written lease." 767 P.2d at 
499, App. A. The trial court was bound and could not exceed 
this Court's authorization on remand. 
The Court's decision itself merely noted that on November 
30, 1981 Cottonwood "nullified" the lease, and Sine had a duty 
to vacate. "At that time, defendant had the duty to vacate, and 
when it failed to do so, the provisions for the payment of 
attorney fees became operative." 767 P.2d at 503 (Utah 1988), 
App. A. And the Court noted that the lease provided for those 
fees only for "actions by the lessor to secure possession of the 
premises at the expiration of the lessee's term. . . . " Id., 
emphasis supplied. 
Yet neither Cottonwood nor the lower court made an effort 
to distinguish the attorney fees expended to gain possession 
from other fees incurred. Cottonwood regained possession 
shortly after it served its notice to quit, before the trial or 
appeal. Id. at 500. How can Cottonwood seek recovery of fees 
for those periods? 
The lease contains no provision for attorney fees for 
litigation or appeals concerning other issues. Issues at trial 
and on appeal included the ability of a joint venture to sue in 
its own name and various other matters, including the existence 
and terms of an alleged oral lease agreement and/or option 
contract. Most issues litigated had little to do with rent, 
much less possession (which had already been obtained). 
The last sentence of the Court's decision is also 
consistent with this analysis. It instructs the lower court to 
"determine and fix" on remand "the amount of attorney fees" and 
the "trial and appeal costs" to which Cottonwood is entitled. 
767 P.2d at 504 (Utah 1988)
 f emphasis supplied. Costs, then, 
may be awarded for the trial and appeal. Fees on the other 
hand, are limited by the opinion to repossesing the bowling 
alley space at Cottonwood Mall. 
8. Paragraph 33 limits Cottonwood to amounts incurred 
during the "terms" of the lease. App. C, 1[ 33, introductory 
language, emphasis supplied. Under the reasoning of the Court, 
this would include the actual term of the lease, as well as the 
hold-over period which ended in October, 1981. 767 P.2d at 503 
(Utah 1988), App. A. Under no rationale could the attorney fee 
clause apply to periods after the lease expired. 
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CONCLUSION 
The matter must be remanded to the trial court for 
discovery and a trial on the attorney fee issue. The lower 
court should be instructed on remand to award no attorney fees 
incurred after cottonwood recovered the premises. 
Respectfully submitted this ninth day of May, 1990. 
Ronald C. Barker 
Mitchell R. Barker 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused an original and nine 
copies of the foregoing to be filed with the Clerk of this 
Court, and further that I caused four copies thereof to be hand 
delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, on this ninth day of May, 
1990, to the following at the address indicated. 
Raymond Scott Berry 
528 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mitchell R. Barker 
- 16 -
APPENDIX A 
(ORIGINAL OPINION OP THIS COURT} 
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY 
Plaintiff, Appellee, and 
Croat—Appellant. 
v. 
Wesley F. SINE, dba Cottonwood 
Bowling Lanes, et al., Defendant, 
Appellant, and Cross-Appellee. 
COTTONWOOD MALL CO. v. SINE Utah 499 
Cite M 767 FM 499 (t)uh IMS) 
2. Landlord and Tenant *=»81lA 
Trial court properly declined to fmd or 
make an agreement to renew a lease which 
had terminated by its own terms at its 
expiration date in situation where commer-
cial lessor and lessee had failed to negoti-
ate a renewal on their own. 
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY, a 
joint venture, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wesley F. SINE, dba Cottonwood Bowl-
ing Lanes, Defendant and Appellant. 
Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, 
Inc., Intervenor. 
Nos. 19839, 19861. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 17, 1988. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 1989. 
Lessor brought action to recover pos-
session of space occupied by lessee. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, J. 
Dennis Frederick, J., entered judgment in 
favor of lessor and denied attorney fees to 
lessor. Lessee appealed judgment in favor 
of lessor and lessor appealed denial of at-
torney fees. The Supreme Court, Howe, 
Associate C.J., held that: (1) trial court 
properly declined to find or make an agree-
ment to renew a lease which had terminat-
ed by its own terms at its expiration date 
where commercial lessor and lessee had 
failed to negotiate a renewal on their own, 
and (2) provision in lease regarding attor-
ney fees remained binding on lessee 
deemed to have established a month-to-
month tenancy with lessor where no evi-
dence as to modification of the provision 
was presented. 
Affirmed, and case remanded to deter-
mine amount of fees and costs. 
1. Joint Adventures *»8 
Joint venture can bring suit in its com-
mon name without the necessity of naming 
the joint venturers as plaintiffs. 
3. Landlord and Tenant *=»44(1) 
Proof of a holdmg over after the expi-
ration of a fixed term m a lease gives rise 
to the presumption, which in the absence of 
contrary evidence will be controlling, that 
the holdover tenant continues to be bound 
by the covenants which were binding upon 
him during the fixed term; this rule pre-
vails even though certain of the provisions 
in the expired lease are changed. 
4. Landlord and Tenant $=285(9) 
In absence of evidence by either party 
that provisions and conditions of written 
lease were modified during month-to-month 
tenancy, except for the increase in the 
amount of rent, provision in written lease 
regarding attorney fees remained binding 
on the parties until expiration of month-to-
month tenancy established as a result of 
lessee holding over. 
Raymond Scott Berry, Salt Lake City, for 
Cottonwood Mall Co. 
Jack L. Schoenhals, Salt Lake City, for 
Wesley F. Sine. 
Ronald C. Barker, Salt Lake City, for 
Cottonwood Bowling Lanes. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Cottonwood Mall Co., a joint 
venture, brought this action to recover pos-
session of space in the Cottonwood Mall 
occupied by defendant Wesley F. Sine and 
intervenor Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, 
Inc., a corporation of which Sine is the 
president. Defendant and intervenor (here-
inafter defendant or Sine) counterclaimed 
to enforce an alleged oral agreement to 
renew the expired lease under which the 
space was held. From a judgment in favor 
of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Plaintiff 
cross-appeals from the denial of an award 
500 Utah 767 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
of attorney fees incurred in recovering pos-
session of the space. 
On May 4, 1961, Sidney M. Horman, as 
lessor, and S.W. Pugsley, as lessee, entered 
into a twenty-year lease of space in the 
Cottonwood Hall, a shopping center in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, to be used for bowling 
lanes. In 1979, Sine was contemplating the 
purchase of the outstanding stock of Cot-
tonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc., a corpora-
tion, which operated the bowling lanes. 
The corporation was controlled by Pugs-
ley's son. Sine caused his real estate 
agents to approach Horman and inquire as 
to his willingness to renew the lease which 
was due to expire on September 14, 1981. 
On at least two occasions, Horman advised 
the agents that he would be willing to 
renew the lease on reasonable terms, but 
that he would not sign a new agreement 
until closer to the time the lease expired. 
Allegedly based on these representations, 
Sine purchased the outstanding stock of 
the Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc., for 
$338,000, took an assignment of the lease, 
and began to operate the bowling lanes. 
Prior to expending money for improve-
ments on his newly acquired space, Sine 
again requested his agents to inquire of 
Horman regarding renewal of the lease. 
Horman allegedly assured the agents that 
he would renew the lease on reasonable 
terms at or about the time the present 
lease would expire. Sine contends that he 
spent $10,000 to $20,000 to improve and 
remodel the leased space, based on the 
additional representation by Horman and 
his reputation for being a man of his word. 
Horman's interest in the lease was there-
after assigned to plaintiff. 
Prior to the expiration of the lease, plain-
tiff notified defendant that the lease would 
expire by its terms on September 14, 1981, 
and that defendant would become a tenant 
on a month-to-month basis as provided for 
in the lease. In October of 1981, plaintiff 
increased the monthly rental substantially 
and shortly thereafter notified defendant 
that the month-to-month tenancy was ter-
minated and the premises should be vacat-
ed by November 30, 1981. Defendant did 
not vacate by that date, as the parties were 
involved in negotiating a new lease. When 
those efforts failed, plaintiff brought this 
action to recover possession and its attor-
ney fees thereby incurred. Defendant 
counter-claimed, seeking to enforce Hor-
man's oral promise to renew upon reason-
able terms. Before trial, defendant vacatr 
ed and moved to other premises. The trial 
court denied defendant any relief on its 
counterclaim and awarded judgment to 
plaintiff for the reasonable rental value of 
the leased space during the time that de-
fendant occupied it after the expiration of 
the written lease. Plaintiff, however, was 
refused any attorney fees. Defendant ap-
peals, and plaintiff cross-appeals from the 
judgment. 
I 
In its answer to plaintif f s complaint, de-
fendant asserted the defense of lack of 
standing of plaintiff, a joint venture, to sue 
in the name of the joint venture as indis-
pensable parties plaintiff It argued that 
the individual members ai-e the "real party 
in interest" under Utah Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 17(a). The trial court denied a pretrial 
motion to dismiss the complaint based on 
this defense. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3.1 
(1981, Supp.1987) defines a "joint venture" 
as "an association of two or more persons 
to carry on as co-owners of a single busi-
ness enterprise" and provides that the 
property and transfer rights of joint ven-
tures shall be governed by the same stat-
utes as general partnerships. Sections 48-
1-1 through -40 contain Utah's adaptation 
of the Uniform Partnership Act Its provi-
sions are silent on whether a partnership 
may sue in its own name. Rule 17(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a 
partnership may be sued in its common 
name, but whether the partnership may 
sue is not specified. We noted in Kemp v. 
Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759 (Utah 1984), 
that whether a partnership is empowered 
to sue in the partnership's name has not 
been decided in this state. Earlier in Wall 
Investment Co. v. Garden Gate Distribut-
ing, Inc., 593 P.2d 542 (ttah 1979), we held 
that a limited partnership is a statutory 
creation and, having characteristics some-
what similar to corporations, could sue in 
COTTONWOOD MALL CO. •. SINE 
Cite M 767 POd 499 (Utah 19S8) 
Utah 501 
the courts of this state in its own name 
without identifying its partners or making 
them plaintiffs. We noted in that case that 
the common law rule that partners were 
required to join as plaintiffs in actions to 
enforce partnership rights has been criti-
cized as a "useless relic of strict procedural 
rules with nothing, apparently, to justify 
its continued existence" and that the mod-
ern tendency is to depart from it 
Recently, in Gary Energy Corp, v. Met-
ro Oil Products, 114 F.R.D. 69 (D.Utah 
1987), Judge Winder analyzed the issue un-
der Utah law and concluded that a joint 
venture can bring suit in its common name 
without the necessity of naming the joint 
venturers as plaintiffs. Noting our criti-
cism in Wall Investment Co. of the com-
mon law rule and the tendency of courts to 
depart from it, Judge Winder opined that 
this Court would, when faced squarely with 
the issue, hold that joint venturers may sue 
in the name of the joint venture. In that 
decision, he also relied upon a recent opin-
ion, Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth 
Edison Co., 714 R2d 155, 56 A.L.R.4th 
1227 (Mont.1986), which came to that same 
conclusion after an analysis of Montana 
statutes and rules of procedure. The court 
there noted that there was no statute or 
rule of procedure in Montana granting 
partnerships or joint ventures the right to 
sue in their own names. Montana Rule of 
Civil Procedure 17(b) states that the capaci-
ty of persons to sue and be sued should be 
determined by appropriate statutory provi-
sions. The court therefore looked to provi-
sions of the Uniform Partnership Act, 
which has been adopted in Montana. Sec-
tion 8 of the Act (our section 48-1-5) pro-
vides that partnerships may own property. 
Section 9(3Xe) (our section 48-l-6(3Xe) 
speaks of partnership "claim[s]." Another 
Montana statute allows partnerships to be 
sued in their own names. Finally, the 
court noted that partnerships are autho-
rized to file small claims actions. In com-
menting on the effect of the foregoing 
statutes, the court stated: 
[TJhis Court has little choice but to fol-
low the clear intent of the Montana Leg-
islature to treat partnerships as distinct 
entities with power to sue. It would be 
illogical and unfair to conclude that a 
partnership may own a claim but cannot 
enforce it; may own property but cannot 
protect it; may be sued but cannot sue; 
may sue in small claims court but not in 
Federal Court The Montana Legisla-
ture should not be deemed to have acted 
*o capriciously. 
Decker Coal Co., 714 P.2d at 157. To the 
list of examples given by the Montana 
court where the Uniform Partnership Act 
treats a partnership as an entity, we add 
section 13 of the Act (which is our section 
48-1-10), making the partnership entity lia-
ble for the negligence of one of the part-
ners while acting within the ordinary 
course of the business of the partnership. 
See Wayne-Oakland Bank v. Adams' Rib, 
48 Mich.App. 144, 210 N.W.2d 121 (1973) 
(where a partnership was held liable for a 
partner's negligence even though the part-
ner had immunity under the law by reason 
of his parental relation to the injured par-
ty). 
t l ] We agree with the analysis and rea-
soning of Judge Winder in Gary Energy 
Corp. and with the Montana Supreme 
Court in Decker Coal Co. and hold that the 
trial court properly denied defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss. 
II 
Defendant contends that the expressed 
affirmations and promises of Horman and 
defendant's reliance thereon either re-
newed the written lease or, in the alterna-
tive, entitled defendant to a renewal of the 
lease upon "reasonable terms." In that 
event, "reasonable terms" would be based 
on the written lease, the only issues to be 
determined being the amount of rent and 
thfe term of the renewed lease. This con-
tention is fully answered by Pingree v. 
Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 
1317 (Utah 1976). There, the lease granted 
thfe lessee the option to renew the lease for 
two separate additional five-year terms 
upon the same terms and conditions of the 
original lease, except 
502 Utah 767 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
that the rental amount will be renegotiat-
ed; however, maximum total monthly 
rental shall not exceed $900 per month. 
Factors of tax increase, costs of busi-
ness increases or decreases, business vol-
ume and success, insurance costs and 
other reasonable allowances, will be the 
basis for terms of negotiation. 
Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1320. 
The lessee gave timely notice of his exer-
cise of the option to renew. The lessors 
responded that the new rental would be 
$900 per month, basing their demand on 
the increase in taxes and insurance and 
what they considered to be a fair return on 
their investment in the leased premises. 
The lessee replied and proposed $500-per-
month rent based on his increased costs of 
doing business and a decrease in his vol-
ume. When the parties were unable to 
agree on the rent for the renewal period, 
the lessor brought an action to recover 
possession. The lessee counterclaimed for 
enforcement of a five-year renewal at $500 
per month. The trial court found that the 
parties had impliedly agreed on a reason-
able rental figure which the court deter-
mined and fixed at $900 per month. On 
appeal, this Court reversed the trial court, 
stating that it had nullified the express 
factors specified by the parties in the lease 
and had substituted a new agreement to 
which the parties had not committed them-
selves. We held that the option to renew 
was too vague and indefinite to be enforce 
able and that the lease terminated at the 
end of the original term. We cited with 
approval and relied on Valcarce v. Bitters, 
12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (1961), 
where we stated, "[A] condition precedent 
to the enforcement of any contract is that 
there be a meeting of the minds of the 
parties, which must be spelled out, either 
expressly or impliedly, with sufficient defi-
niteness to be enforced." In so ruling, this 
Court followed what was termed the major-
ity rule in Slayter v. Pasley, 199 Or. 616, 
264 P.2d 444 (1953), which was stated to be 
that a provision for the extension or re-
newal of a lease must specify the time 
the lease is to extend and the rate of rent 
to be paid with such a degree of certain-
ty and definiteness that nothing is left to 
future determination. If it falls short of 
this requirement, it is not enforceable. 
Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1321. In reversing 
the trial court, this Court expressly reject-
ed its attempt to fix a reasonable rent for 
the parties when their negotiations bogged 
down. 
[2] Defendant would have us now do 
what we refused to do in Pingree. While it 
is true that defendant adduced evidence as 
to what would be a reasonable renewal 
term and what would be a reasonable rent, 
the trial court properly spurned defend-
ant's invitation to find or make an agree-
ment where the parties had themselves 
failed. Defendant argues that in Pingree, 
the court declined to fix the renewal rent 
because of the difficulty in balancing the 
several factors which the lease required the 
parties to consider in fixing the rent. 
Here, defendant's argument continues, no 
factors are listed in the lease and the task 
is less complicated. We do not agree. In 
determining what is "reasonable rent," 
many factors must be weighed and put into 
the equation. Business judgments must be 
made. Horman testified that he would not 
negotiate a new lease at the time Sine's 
real estate agents approached him because 
of inflation and instability in the commer-
cial leasing market. He was unwilling to 
enter into another lease, either long term 
or short term, unless he could consider the 
costs of operating and owning the building 
as they compared to the amount of rent 
received. He only indicated that he would 
be willing to enter into a new lease at a 
reasonable figure and at the appropriate 
time. After he sold his interest in the 
leased property to plaintiff, plaintiff and 
defendant were unable to agree on the 
amount of rent. Courts simply are not 
equipped to make monetary decisions im-
pacted by the fluctuating commercial world 
and are even less prepared \o impose pater-
nalistic agreements on litigants. We there-
fore conclude that the written lease termi-
nated by its own terms at its expiration 
date, was not renewed by the parties, and 
cannot be renewed for them by the courts. 
Ill 
Turning now to plaintiffs cross-appeal, 
namely, that the trial court erred in deny-
ing it attorney fees, plaintiffs claim for fee 
was premised on the following provision in 
the 1961 written lease: 
If, during the terms of this lease, lessor 
is required to commence any action to 
collect any of the rental due under this 
lease, or to enforce any of the provisions 
herein, or to secure possession of the 
leased premises in the event this lease is 
terminated as herein provided, or at the 
expiration of the term, lessee agrees, in 
such event or events, to pay all costs of 
such action or actions, together with rea-
sonable attorney's fee. 
The trial court denied fees "for the reason 
that the lease agreement upon which plain-
tiff makes claim for attorney's fees expired 
by its terms, and the plaintiff terminated 
the lease agreement and treated the lease 
agreement as though it had expired and 
been terminated " 
[3,4] We do not agree with that conclu-
sion. It is true that the 1961 written lease 
was for a twenty-year term that expired on 
September 14, 1981; however, paragraph 
36 of that lease provided: "Any holdover 
beyond the termination of this lease, and 
any acceptance of rental beyond the term 
of this lease shall be deemed to have estab-
lished a month-to-month tenancy as be-
tween lessor and lessee/' Nothing is there 
stated, however, regarding whether the 
provisions and conditions of the written 
lease are binding on the parties during the 
month-to-month tenancy. It is a firmly es-
tablished rule that proof of a holding over 
after the expiration of a fixed term in a 
lease gives rise to the presumption, which 
in the absence of contrary evidence will be 
controlling, that the holdover tenant contin-
ues to be bound by the covenants which 
were binding upon him during the fixed 
term. Annotation, Binding Effect on Ten-
ant Holding Over of Covenants in Ex-
pired Lease, 49 A.L.R.2d 480 (1956). It is 
further pointed out there that this rule 
obtains even though certain of the provi-
sions in the expired lease are changed, such 
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as, for example, the provision as to the 
amount of rent to be paid. 
Applying those rules to the instant case, 
when the twenty-year term of the 1961 
written lease expired on September 14, 
1981, defendant held over on a month-to-
month basis and continued to be bound by 
the provisions and conditions of the written 
lease during that holdover period. The 
fact that on October 12, 1981, plaintiff noti-
fied defendant that the monthly rental was 
being increased from $2,150 per month to 
$4,500 per month did not affect the binding 
force of the other provisions of the written 
lease. On October 23, 1981, plaintiff ad-
vised defendant that it had elected to "nul-
lify" the month-to-month tenancy and re-
quested that defendant vacate the premises 
by November 30, 1981. Since there was no 
evidence by either party that the provisions 
and conditions of the written lease were 
modified during the month-to-month tenan-
cy, except for the increase in the amount of 
rent, the provision in the 1961 lease regard-
ing attorney fees remained binding on the 
parties until the month-to-month tenancy 
expired on November 30, 1981. At that 
time, defendant had the duty to vacate, and 
when it failed to do so, the provision for the 
payment of attorney fees became opera-
tive. As will be noted, that provision spe-
cifically covers actions by the lessor to 
secure possession of the premises at the 
expiration of the lessee's term, which under 
the rule stated above includes the holdover 
period. Consequently, the trial court erred 
in denying any award of attorney fees to 
plaintiff. 
The judgment is affirmed, and the case is 
remanded to the trial court to determine 
and fix the amount of attorney fees and 
trial and appeal costs to which plaintiff is 
entitled under paragraph 33 of the written 
lease. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ, 
concur. 
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CCIMWY 
RAYMOND SCOTT BERRY ( 0 3 1 1 ) 
GREEN & BERRY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 1 nip^^V >,**,< 
528 Newhouse Building \ jjj^ l* * -*/' ^d^ 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY, 
a joint venture. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WESLEY F. SINE, d/b/a 
COTTONWOOD BOWLING LANES, 
an individual and COTTONWOOD 
BOWLING LANES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C82-2081 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, one of the Judges of the 
above-entitled Court, on September 7, 1983, at the hour of 10:00 
a.m. The Plaintiff was represented by Raymond Scott Berry. 
Defendant Wesley F. Sine was represented by Jack L. Schoenhals. 
Defendant Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc. was represented by Ronald 
C. Barker. The parties having advised the Court that they were 
ready to proceed, the Plaintiff and Defendant having called 
witnesses and the same having been sworn and having giving 
testimony, and the parties having introduced evidence, and the 
same having been received by the Court, and the Court having heard 
argument of counsel and having been fully advised in the premises, 
the parties having rested their cases, and the Court having 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 6, 
1984, enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendants, jointly and severally, on February 27, 1984, awarding 
Plaintiff, among other relief, the sum of $32,700, said sum to 
bear interest thereon at 12% per annum from date of entry. 
Subsequently, Defendants appealed the decision of the 
trial court. Plaintiff cross-appealed on the refusal of the trial 
court to award Plaintiff attorney's fees. On or about March 9, 
1984, Defendants filed a Supersedeas Appeal Bond, naming Jerry 
Sine and Dora Sine as sureties, in the amount of $65,400. The 
action was briefed and argued before the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, which rendered a decision thereon on November 17, 
1988, rejecting Defendants1 appeal, but granting Plaintiff's 
appeal on the matter of an award of attorney's fees. 
Thereafter, Defendant Wesley F. Sine filed a Petition for 
lehearing. Said Petition for Rehearing was denied by the Supreme 
:ourt of the State of Utah on or about January 25, 1989, and the 
atter duly remitted to the Clerk of the Third Judicial District 
ourt for further action pursuant to the opinion of the Utah 
upreme Court. Pursuant to that opinion and in conformance 
herewith, this Court hereby enters its amended judgment in favor 
Plaintiff and against Defendants as follows: 
JUDGMENT 
1. Plaintiff is awarded an amended judgment against the 
fendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $104,014.77, 
and against Jerry Sine and Dora Sine, jointly and severally, as 
sureties, to the extent of $65,400, as per the calculations set 
forth below: 
Description Amount 
Original trial court judgment of 
$32,700,00 with interest thereon 
from February 27, 1984 through 
February 27, 1989 calculated as per 
the Court's Minute Entry of 
April 13, 1989: $ 52,320.00 
Attorney's fees incurred by 
Plaintiff in the pre-judgment phase 
of these proceedings, with interest 
thereon at the rate of 12% per 
annum in the amount of: 39,744,62 
Post-judgment attorney's fees in 
the amount of: 6,641.58 
TOTAL: $ 98,706.20 
Said amount to bear interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum 
in conformance with the original judgment entered herein. 
2. The claims of the Plaintiff insofar as they relate to 
an unlawful detainer action be, and the same are, hereby 
dismissed, no cause of action. 
3. The Defendants' Counterclaims be, and the same are, 
hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits, no cause of 
action. 
4. The Defendants have no right, title or interest in 
and to the property which is the subject matter of this action. 
DATED this fl^day of ^ffe , 1989. 
COURT 
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nges in 28. Lessor reserves the right to change or add to or subtract from the improve-
?ping 
ter ments from time to time constituting a part of Cottonwood Shopping Center, including 
the erection of additional buildings, if Lessor so ducts; provided, however, that 
parking and maneuvering area shall be provided in the adjoining area to allow for 
equal car parking ratio per square foot of ground floor of buildings as is now shown 
on attached plot plan marked exhibit B, hereto attached. 
etting or 29. Lessee shall not allow or permit any transfer of this Lease or any interest 
gnment 
under it, or any lien upon Lessee's interest by operation of law, or assign or convey 
this Lease, or any interest under it, or sublet the premises or any part thereof, or 
permit the use or occupancy of the premises or any part thereof by anyone other than 
Lessee without the written consent of Lessor. 
*rved Rights 30. Lessor reserves the following rights: 
essor 
(a) to change the name or street address of the building without notice or 
liability of Lessor to Lessee, 
(b) to enter the premises or any part thereof at reasonable hours to make in-
spections, repairs, alterations, or additions in or to the premises or the 
building, to exhibit the premises to prospective tenants, purchasers, or 
others, to display during the last ninety days of the term without hindrance 
or molestation by Lessee "For Rent" and similar signs on windows or 
elsewhere in or on the premises, and to perform any acts related to the 
safety, protection, preservations, reletting, sale, or improvements of 
the premises or the building; and 
(c) during the last ninety days of the term, or any part thereof, if during or 
prior to that time Lessee vacates the premises , to enter and decorate, 
remodel, repair, alter, or otherwise prepare the premises for reoccu-
pancy. 
The exercise of any of these reserved rights by Lessor shall never be deemed 
an eviction or disturbance of Lessee's use and possession of the premises and shall 
never render Lessor liable in any manner to Lessee or to any other person. 
and Other 31. If the premises or the building are made wholly untenantable by fire or other 
talty 
casualty, Lessor may elect: 
(a) to terminate the term of this Lease as of the date of the fire, or other 
casualty, by notice to Lessee within thirty days after the date, or 
(b) to repair, restore, or rehabilitate the building or the premises at Irsior'*? 
expense within one hundred twenty days after Lessor is enabled to take 
possession of the injured premises, and to undertake the repairs, restor-
ation, or rehabilitation, in which latter event the term of this Lease shall 
not terminate, but the fixed rent shall be abated on a per diem ba*?is while 
the premises are untenantable. If Lessor elects to repair, restore, or 
rehabilitate the building or premises, and does not substantially complete 
7 
the work within the 120-day period, due allowance being made for any 
prevention of Lessor's so doing by'reason of practical impossibility, 
either party can terminate this LeaseVm of the date of the fire or other 
casualty by notice to the other party not later than one hundred thirty 
days after Lessor is enabled to take possession of the injured premises 
and to undertake the repairs, restoration, or rehabilitation. In event of 
termination of the term of this Lease pursuant to this section, fixed rents 
shall be apportioned on a per diem basis and be paid to the date of the fire 
or other casualty, and percentage rentai shall be paid to the termination 
of this Lease. 
Unless wilfully caused, JLessee shall not be liable to Lessor for loss or damage 
to the premises or trade fixtures or equipment by fire as a result of any act or omis-
sion on the part of Lessee or any of his employees for whom Lessee may be legally 
responsible if said demised premises, trade fixtures, and equipment are covered by 
insurance. 
32o Lessor and Lessor's agents and servants shall not be liable and Lessee 
waives all claims for damage to person or property sustained by Lessee or any occu-
pant of the building or premises resulting from the building or premises or any part 
of either, or any equipment or appurtenance being or becoming out of repair, or re-
suiting from any accident in or about the building, or resulting directly or indirectly 
from any act or neglect of any tenant or occupant of the building or of any other person. 
33. Time is of the essence of this agreement. In the event Lessee fails to keep 
any covenant, agreement, or promise as in this Lease set forth, then the same shall 
constitute a breach hereof on the part of Lessee, and at the option of Lessor this 
Lease may be terminated by Lessor giving five days notice in writing if the breach is 
non-payment of rent, or thirty days notice in writing in the event of breach of any 
other covenant or agreement, of its election to terminate this Lease for the breach of 
any covenant herein contained, providing said breach is not remedied, corrected, or 
ma6 whole by Lessee during said period. The failure of Lessor to terminate this 
Lease at any time during the breach of any of the terms hereof shall be deemed only 
an indulgence by Lessor for that particular breach, and shall not be construed to be 
a waiver of the rights of Lessor as to any further or subsequent breach. If, during 
the terms of this Lease, Lessor is required to commence any action to collect any of 
v
.he rental due under this Lease, or to enforce any of the provisions herein, or to 
secure possession of the leased premises in the event this Lease is terminated as 
herein provided, or at the expiration of the term, Lessee agrees, in such event or 
events, to pay all costs of such action or actions, together w i t n reasonable attorney's 
fee. 
Ivency of 34. In the event Lessee is adjudicated a bankrupt, or a Petition in Bankruptcy is 
see 
filed against Lessee, and is not dismissed within sixty days thereafter, or Lessee 
voluntarily offers to creditors terms of composition, or in case a Receiver is ap-
pointed to take charge and conduct the affairs of Lessee, Lessor may, at its option, 
declare this Lease terminated and null and void, and may re-enter the premises im-
mediately. In such event, the next subsequent twelve installments of rent, or such 
unpaid, shall forthwith become due and payable at the option of Lessor without notice 
to Lessee, and such claim for further unpaid installments of rent due under this 
Lease shall be considered liquidated damages and shall constitute a debt provable in 
bankruptcy or receivership. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the 
right of Lessor to prove its claim in such bankruptcy or receivership for install-
ments of rent due and unpaid at the time of such bankruptcy or receivership, regard-
less of whether Lessor elects to terminate this Lease as hereinabove provided. 
render of 35. All Lessee installations or additions to the premises which cannot be removed 
session 
without damage to the premises shall be deemed Lessor's property; provided, how-
ever, that Lessor may elect prior to the termination of the Lease, or within ten days 
thereafter, to require Lessee to remove any installation or addition at Lessee's ex-
pense. Lessee shall, prior to any such termination of the term of this Lease, or at 
Lessee's right to possession, remove from the premises ail Lessee's furniture, 
trade fixtures, and other personal property of every kind whatsoever not becoming 
Lessor's property as hereinbefore specified, and in default of such removal by 
Lessee all such property and every interest of Lessee in the same, shall be con-
clusively presumed to have been conveyed by Lessee to Lessor under this Lease as 
a Bill of Sale without compensation, allowance, or credit to Lessee. Lessee shall, 
upon such termination of the term of this Lease or of Lessee's right to possession, 
return to Lessor the premises and all equipment and fixtures comprising a part 
thereof in as good condition as when Lessee took possession, excepting only ordinary 
wear and tear and damage by fire or other casualty for which Lessee is not legally 
responsible. 
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RAYMOND SCOTT BERRY 10311) 
GREEN & BERRY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
528 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY, 
a joint venture, 
Plaintiff, 
WESLEY F. SINE, d/b/a 
COTTONWOOD BOWLING LANES, 
an individual and COTTONWOOD 
BOWLING LANES, INC*, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The Plaintiff in the above-entitled action through its 
undersigned counsel, Raymond Scott Berry, respectfully submits the 
following Affidavit of Attorney's Fees in support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Entry of Amended Judgment filed herewith. 
Raymond Scott Berry, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. That affiant is an adult resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, with personal knowledge of the facts stated 
herein. Affiant1s actual knowledge of the facts stated herein 
U,* 9 & 55 AH '89 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
C i v i l No. C82-2081 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiff throughout the proceedings* Affiant is a current member 
of the Utah State Bar, and has been at all times mentioned herein. 
2. This action was initiated by Plaintiff in March of 
1982. The action was aggressively litigated by all parties. 
Extensive pre-trial work was required, as the size of the court's 
file will indicate. Substantial discovery was conducted by all 
parties. The action was tried to the Court in September of 1983, 
and judgment initially was entered herein on February 27, 1984. 
3. Affiant has reviewed his billing records relative to 
this action, including the individual monthly bills and the client 
ledger. Those documents indicate that attorney's fees incurred by 
the Plaintiff in the pre-judgment phase of this action, including 
office costs passed on the Plaintiff directly, total $22,552.17. 
Adding interest to that figure at the rate of 12% per annum as per 
the initial interest figure contained in the original judgment, 
brings the total attorney's fee figure for the pre-judgment phase 
to $39,744.62. 
4. Following the trial court decision this matter was 
appealed by Defendants, and Plaintiff cross-appealed on the trial 
court's denial of an award of attorney's fees. Briefs were duly 
prepared and filed, and the matter was argued orally to the Utah 
Supreme Court in June of 1987. The decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court was issued on November 17, 1988, affirming the trial court 
in regard to the judgment rendered against the Defendants, but 
reversing the trial court as to its decision to deny Plaintiff's 
recovery of attorney's fees. 
5. Following issuance of the decision Defendants filed a 
Petition for Rehearing with the Utah Supreme Court, Plaintiff was 
invited to respond to the Petition for Rehearing by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Plaintiff duly filed an answer to Defendant's 
Petition for Rehearing. Petition for Rehearing was denied 
effective January 25, 1989. 
6. Affiant's review of his office records as referred to 
above indicates post-judgment attorney's fees in the amount of 
$6,641.58. 
7. Attached to this Affidavit are true and correct 
copies of the affiant's office ledger records indicating amounts 
actually charged by affiant to Plaintiff. 
8. Further affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this / day of tf\o\W\ , 1989. 
GREEN & BERRY 
/A*/' 
RAYMOND SCOTT BERRY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
UBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
•7 # 1989. 
day of 
My Commi 
MC173:3-J 
NOTARY(JPUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah 
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Green and Berty 
Client Ledger Card PAGE 1 
e Development, Inc. 
:e/Cottonwood Mall v. Sine 
: Number: P-124.47-82 
igement Division 
i: Carolyn Okumura 
:entury Parkway 
; Lake City UT 84115 
le: 486-39H 
Litigation 
Standard: Show W.I.P, 
Monthly 
Trust Balance: 
Case Rate: $85.00 
Case Attorney: RSB 
APR Interest: None 
on Bills 
None 
:e Description 
Balance From Last Statement 
Amount Balance 
$185.00 
$15.00 
$185.00 
$227.50 
$291.25 
2/88 
Lved 
1/88 
ived 
JVL 
RSB 
8/88 
rocess 
RSB 
1/88 RSB 
rocess 
$ 60/hr .25 Hours 
Telephone conference to Supreme Court 
clerk; review of file, draft of Motion 
to Reconsider Adequacy of Supersedeas 
Bond; review of rules re: bonds; 
$ 85/hr 2.00 Hours 
Appearance at Motion to Reconsider 
Adequacy of Supersedeas Bond and 
Drafting Supreme Court Motion; 
$ 85/hr .50 Hours 
Review Supreme Court Opinion; telephone 
conference with Mike Frei; 
$ 85/hr .75 Hours $63 
Draft withdrawal of Motion regarding 
Supersedeas Bonds; 
$15.00 
$170.00 
$42.50 
75 
Ledger Card Totals - All Entries 
(Including Archived Entries) 
Total Ledger Entries . . . 
Less Work in Process . . . 
Total Billed Entries This Report . . . 
$291.25 
-$106.25 
$185.00 
Case Information Through 11/21/88 
Total Amount Billable . . . 
Less Total Work in Process . 
Total Amount Owing . . . 
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